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Abstract. This paper presents MarkPledge3 (MP3), the most eﬃcient
speciﬁcation of the MarkPledge (MP) technique. The MP technique al-
lows the voter to verify that her vote is correctly encrypted with a sound-
ness of 1−2−α, with 20 ≤ α ≤ 30, just by performing a match of a small
string (4-5 characters). Due to its simplicity, verifying the election public
data (vote encryptions and tally) in MP3 is 2.6 times faster than with
MP2 and the vote encryption creation on devices with low computational
power, e.g. smart cards, is approximately 6 times better than the best of
the previous MP speciﬁcations (MP1 and MP2).
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1 Introduction
The MarkPldege (MP) technique was introduced by Neﬀ in 2004 [22] with the
goal of providing high vote encryption assurance to the voter, i.e. give the voter
high certainty that the encrypted vote, generated by the voting machine, is an en-
cryption of the voter’s choice. In its essence MP deﬁnes how to encrypt two types
of votes: a vote in favor of a candidate, a Y ESvote, and a vote against/neutral
to a candidate, a NOvote. The MP candidate vote encryption is special because
it contains random data that is used to create a veriﬁcation code, which can to
prove to the voter the type of the candidate vote encryption. The voter veriﬁes
that a candidate vote encryption is in fact a Y ESvote by doing a short string
match. The veriﬁcation of a NOvote usually requires some extra eﬀort from the
voter, but can be made unneeded by the speciﬁc vote protocol where it is used.
In MP based vote protocols [1,3,4,19,22], the voter’s choice is encrypted with
a Y ESvote, for the selected candidate, and with several independent NOvotes
for the non selected candidates. Then, a vote receipt is created with the veri-
ﬁcation codes of all candidate vote encryptions. To simplify the voter’s receipt
veriﬁcation, the vote protocol provides a mathematical proof that there is only
one Y ESvote in the set of candidate encryptions, therefore the voter only needs
to verify the Y ESvote candidate encryption.
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The soundness of the voter veriﬁcation process is 1 − 2−α, where α is a con-
ﬁgurable security parameter that deﬁnes the size in bits of the veriﬁcation code
to match. To achieve a usability vs security balance, α is usually set to a value
between 20 and 30, corresponding to a veriﬁcation code of 4 to 5 characters.
The high soundness of the voter’s receipt veriﬁcation is only guaranteed if
the vote encryption is valid and the vote receipt correct, i.e. if there is only
one Y ESvote and if all veriﬁcation codes match the corresponding individual
candidate vote encryptions. However, the proofs of vote validity and receipt cor-
rectness require some complex math, which the common voter cannot perform.
Thus, the MP technique, and the vote protocols that use it, deﬁne public veri-
ﬁable vote validity and receipt correctness proofs to protect the voter’s privacy.
Anyone with the suﬃcient knowledge and computational power can verify the
validity and correctness of all vote-receipt pairs.
Our major contribution is a faster MP solution (MP3) that can be proven to
be as sound and privacy-keeping as any of previous MP solutions [4,22], without
consuming more memory. Both previous MP solutions [4, 22] have high com-
putational vote generation costs, which makes them unsuitable to be used in
mobile voting scenarios where the voting machine has low computational power,
e.g. a smart-card or a secure element of a mobile phone, both usually standard
JavaCards. MP3 also oﬀers a considerable 2.6 times improvement on the public
vote-receipt validity and correctness veriﬁcations over the best previous solu-
tion (MP2). This improvement enlarges the number of public organizations with
enough computer power to verify all the votes of a national general election .
Our second contribution is an abstraction layer for the MP technique, com-
posed of 5 functions: the vote encryption function VEpk, which creates the can-
didate vote encryption; the vote receipt creation function RCpk, which given
a candidate encryption generates the corresponding veriﬁcation code; the vote
validity function VVpk, which veriﬁes the validity of a candidate encryption;
the receipt validity function RVpk, which validates the correspondence between
a candidate vote encryption and a veriﬁcation code; and, ﬁnally, a canonical-
ization function Cpk which prepares the candidate vote encryption for the vote
tally process. The MP abstraction layer adds nothing to the MP solutions (MP1,
MP2 and MP3) or to the MP based vote protocols. It only identiﬁes common
processes to all MP solutions, thus, it facilitates the comparison of the diﬀerent
MP solutions and their substitution in a MP based vote protocol.
We have partially implemented each one of the three MP solutions (MP1, MP2
and MP3) in two types of smart-cards, a MULTOS smart card and a JavaCard.
The former is faster, but the latter is more ubiquitous, being deployed in secure
elements of recent mobile phones and many National Identity Cards. In both
cases MP3 is the only viable solution given that the time required to vote with
MP1 and MP2 exceeds the time a user will be, usually, willing to wait.
The next section presents the related work and describes the simpliﬁed version
of a MP vote protocol. Sections 3 and 4 describe the new MP3 proposal and
present a detailed description of its cryptographic functions. Section 5 provide
a comparative analysis of all MP solutions. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
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2 Related Work
The research on electronic voting protocols always had the goal to provide veriﬁ-
able protocols [7,8,13,14,16,17,20,24]. However, the veriﬁcation procedures are
usually too diﬃcult for a human to do, requiring the use of a trusted Vote Ma-
chine (V M) to help the voter in the process. In 2004, Chaum [9] and Neﬀ [22]
(MarkPledge) introduced techniques that enable a human to verify a crypto-
graphic vote, eliminating the need for a trusted V M .
In the original Chaum’s work [9] the voter veriﬁes her vote through a two-
sheet ballot print, by a special printer, that uses transparent sheets and visual
cryptography to show the voter choices in a human readable format. The voter
then destroys one sheet and keeps the other as a veriﬁable privacy-preserving
receipt. This procedure models a simple “cut-and-choose" technique giving the
voter a 12 probability to detect a fraud. Punchscan [10] and Pret a Voter [12]
simplify the Chaum’s system setup by using a simpler pre-printed ballot. In both
systems the voter still have only a probability of 12 to detect any fraud with her
vote. Both systems allow for pre-election cut-and-choose veriﬁcation aiming to
reduce the danger of a large scale fraud. The veriﬁcation procedure consists in
printing an excess of ballots and then randomly auditing the extra ballots.
Adida and Neﬀ [3] and Joaquim et al. [19] present simpliﬁcations to the voter
interaction of MP, improving its usability. In 2006, and also based on the MP
construction, Moran and Naor presented a voter veriﬁable voting system with
everlasting privacy [21], replacing the vote encryption with vote commitments.
The main disadvantage of the original MP speciﬁcation (MP1) is the high com-
putational costs of the technique, specially when compared to a vote protocol
that encrypts the vote as a simple encryption of the candidate identiﬁer. In MP1
the vote is encrypted with 2 · α encryptions for each candidate. A direct conse-
quence of the MP1 vote encryption structure is that the vote encryption needs
2 · α · k more disk space when compared to a simple vote encryption, where k
is the number of running candidates. The performance issues of MP were ﬁrst
addressed in MP2 [4]. However, MP2 is still too heavy for low computational
power devices (cf. section 5.1).
A completely diﬀerent voter veriﬁcation approach was proposed by Benaloh
in [5, 6]. His proposal consists in separating the vote encryption process from
the vote casting process. The V M is responsible only for the vote encryption,
which it delivers to the voter (e.g. in a paper receipt). The voter can then choose
to cast the vote or to verify it by asking to decrypt the encrypted vote. In this
solution the voter can verify as many vote encryptions as she wants until she
gains conﬁdence in the V M . In theory, this approach can have the same 1−2−α
MP soundness if a voter is allowed to use the V M to create 2α independent vote
encryptions. This procedure is clearly unpractical and would yield a computa-
tional cost much higher than the one of the original MP. The ideas of Benaloh’s
work were used for the voter veriﬁcation mechanisms used by the VoteBox [25]
and Helios [2] voting systems.
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2.1 MarkPledge Simplified Vote Protocol Overview
Usually, a voter has no way to be assured that the cryptographical representation
of her vote, produced by the voting machine, encodes her candidate choice. MP
attains that goal by performing a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) with the voter
herself, not with some proxy, that the encrypted vote for the chosen candidate
is, in fact, a Y ESvote. In order to ensure receipt-freeness a simulated ZKP is
conducted for every other candidate encryption (NOvotes), in such a way that
only the voter is able to tell which is the real proof among the simulated ones.
More precisely, zero-knowledge, in the MP context, means that it is not possi-
ble to identify the type of a candidate encryption from the corresponding public
data: candidate encryption, veriﬁcation code and corresponding mathematical
proofs of vote validity and veriﬁcation code correctness. To protect the voter’s
privacy, the correctness veriﬁcation is the same for every candidate encryption,
whether it bares a Y ESvote or a NOvote. In fact, the correctness veriﬁcation is,
in both cases, a ZKP that aims to prove that the candidate encryption bares a
Y ESvote. The proof is only real if the candidate encryption bares a Y ESvote.
This is because only the commit value (veriﬁcation code) of the ZKP of the
Y ESvote is shown (pledged) to the voter. The commit values (veriﬁcation codes)
of the ZKP of the NOvotes are not shown to anyone a may therefore be crafted
so that the ZKP on NOvotes seem real although they are simulated.
To clarify the MP technique use within a vote protocol follows a short descrip-
tion of the simpliﬁed vote protocol of [3]. Note however, that each MP version
(MP1, MP2 and MP3) may be used in diﬀerent voting protocols, e.g. the origi-
nal one [22], the simpliﬁed versions [3,22], and the Internet protocol of [19]. The
described MP vote protocol has four phases [3]: the ﬁrst three match the usu-
ally ZKP (commit, challenge, validation), and the last one is an anonimization
and counting step. The following protocol description also introduces the MP
abstraction layer, i.e. it shows where each of the ﬁve MP functions are used. The
speciﬁcation of each function is given in section 4, for the MP3 solution, and in
an extended version of this paper [18], for the MP1 and MP2 solutions.
Phase 1. Vote Encryption
1. The vote machine (V M) presents the list of candidates to the voter.
2. The voter enters her vote selection (candidate j).
3. The V M , using the candidate vote encryption function VEpk, creates the
vote encryption as a sequence of individual MP candidate vote encryptions
(dubbed as bit encryptions, BitEnc(b) in [1,3,4,19]). The selected candidate
(candidate j) gets a Y ESvote = BitEnc(1), and each other candidate gets
an individual NOvote = BitEnc(0).
Each candidate vote encryption BitEnc(b)i encrypts a random commit code
θi, which later allows the voter to verify the vote encryption by matching
the veriﬁcation code ϑj in the vote receipt. At this point in the protocol only
the veriﬁcation code of the Y ESvote is known ϑj = θj .
4. The V M commits to the vote encryption, e.g. by printing or publishing it
in a public bulletin board.
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5. The V M pledges (reveals on an untappable channel) to the voter the
Y ESvote veriﬁcation code ϑj = θj as the pledge value.
Phase 2. Receipt Creation and Voter Veriﬁcation
1. The voter sends a random vote challenge c to the V M . Originally the chal-
lenge value was chosen by the voter herself [22]; subsequent versions remove
this task from the voter with the help of a trusted third party [3, 19].
This step is crucial for the voter’s veriﬁcation soundness because the random
challenge is what prevents the V M to pledge a valid veriﬁcation code for a
NOvote in the previous protocol step.
2. The V M , using the candidate receipt creation function RCpk, computes
the veriﬁcation codes for the non-selected candidates (ϑi : i = j), i.e. the
veriﬁcation codes for all the NOvotes. Each computed veriﬁcation code ϑi :
i = j is the result of a function between the random commit code θi inside
the corresponding NOvotei and the challenge value c.
3. The V M prints/publishes in a public bulletin board the receipt as the se-
quence of all the veriﬁcation codes ϑi, in the same order of the candidate
vote encryptions in the vote encryption. Along with the vote receipt, the
V M publishes the data necessary to verify the vote validity (voteV alidityi)
and the receipt correctness (ωi). The voteV alidityi and ωi are, respectively,
outputs of the VEpk and RCpk functions.
4. The voter veriﬁes the correction of the vote encryption by verifying if the
pledge value, pledged in step 5 of phase 1, matches the veriﬁcation code ϑj
associated to her chosen candidate (candidate j) in the vote receipt.
Phase 3. Third Party Vote/Receipt Validation
To certify the voter receipt veriﬁcation, one or several third parties validate the
vote/receipt pair validity and correctness, using the vote validity (VVpk) and re-
ceipt validity (RVpk) functions. The VVpk function attests that each BitEnc(b)i
is valid, i.e that it is either a BitEnc(0) or a BitEnc(1). The RVpk function
attests that each veriﬁcation code ϑi corresponds to BitEnc(b)i. Both certiﬁca-
tions are performed only on public data, thus they do not compromise the voter’s
privacy. Optionally, using the techniques described in section 4.1, the third par-
ties can also verify that the encrypted vote has only one Y ESvote. Without
this veriﬁcation the V M can create invalid votes, i.e. votes with more than one
Y ESvote. Although, several MP based vote protocols omit this veriﬁcation step
and only verify that there is only one Y ESvote in the vote encryption in the
tally phase, after the anonymous vote decryption.
Phase 4. Vote Canonicalization and Counting
Finally, the vote encryptions are made uniform, by the vote canonicalization
function Cpk, and then anonymized and counted. The results are published in a
public bulletin board.
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The canonicalization process is necessary because every candidate vote en-
cryption encrypts a random one-time commit code (θi), that is used to deter-
ministically compute the veriﬁcation codes of the BitEnc(b)s. Thus, revealing
the θi commit codes would enable to identify the voter’s candidate choice by a
simple correlation with the veriﬁcation codes ϑi in the voter’s vote receipt.
The vote canonicalization process is public and therefore veriﬁable. Once all
vote encryptions are in the canonical form it is possible to decrypt them and
compute the election vote tally, usually using a mix-net or a homomorphic vote
tally process to protect the voter’s privacy.
The BitEnc(b), voteV alidity and ω details, and the procedures to verify the
vote validity and receipt correctness, are presented in sections 3 and 4, for the
MP3 solution, and in the extended version of this paper [18] for the MP1 and
MP2 solutions.
3 MarkPledge3
The key aspect of every MP system is the two step veriﬁcation of the vote encryp-
tion, carried by the V M to the voter, to prove that the encrypted vote expresses
the voter’s intentions, cf. phases 2 and 3 of the protocol described in section
2.1. This section describes the key insight of this two step proof veriﬁcation in
MP3. It starts by describing the cryptosystem used by MP3, and continues by
showing how its homomorphic properties are used to implement the candidate
vote encryption, the proof and the two step proof validation.
3.1 Homomorphic Cryptosystem Details
The MP3 implementation is based on the homomorphic properties of the ElGa-
mal cryptosystem [15]. The ElGamal cryptosystem works in the Z∗p subgroup Gq
of order q, where p and q are large primes such that q|p−1. Both primes p, q and
a generator g of Gq are public parameters of the system. The ElGamal key pair
consist of a private key s and the corresponding public key h = pk = gs mod p.
The private key s is a randomly chosen integer such that 0 < s < q. Algorithms
to generate secure ElGamal parameters can be found in [23].
A message m ∈ Gq is encrypted by selecting a random integer value r ∈
Zq, and constructing the following pair EGh(m, r) = 〈x, y〉 = 〈gr mod p, hr ·
m mod p〉. To recover the message m one computes m = yxs . In order to have the
desired homomorphic properties we use a variant known as exponential ElGamal
[14]. In exponential ElGamal the message to encrypt m is chosen from Zq and
it is encrypted as gm, instead of m, in order to respect the ElGamal message
space, i.e. Eh(m, r) = EGh(gm, r). The exponential ElGamal has the following
homomorphisms (we have omitted the mod p notation from the equations):
Additive homomorphism between two encryptions
Eh(m1, r1)⊕ Eh(m2, r2) = 〈gr1 , hr1 · gm1〉 · 〈gr2 , hr2 · gm2〉 =
〈gr1 · gr2 , hr1 · gm1 · hr2 · gm2〉 = 〈gr1+r2 , hr1+r2 · gm1+m2〉 =
Eh((m1 + m2) mod q, (r1 + r2) mod q)
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Prover Veriﬁers
Vote Machine Voter Third Party
b′ ∈ {−1, 1}
τ, δ, θ ∈R Zq
u ← 〈gτ , hτ · gb′〉
v ← 〈gδ, hδ · gθ〉
pledge−−−−−→
u, v−−−−−→
c ∈R Zq
c←−−−−−
ϑ ← b′·c−c+θ
b′
ω ← τ · (c− ϑ) + δ
ϑ,ω−−−−−→ u, v, c, ϑ, ω−−−−−−−−→
pledge ?= ϑ uc−ϑ · v ?= 〈gω, hω · gc〉
Fig. 1. MP3 Y ESvote (b′ = 1) candidate encryption and veriﬁcation protocol. The
NOvote (b′ = −1) case is identical, the only diﬀerence is that the voter veriﬁes that
pledge = 2 · c− ϑ instead of pledge = ϑ, cf. section 3.2. ϑ and ω are computed mod q.
Multiplicative Homomorphism between an Encryption and a Value n
Eh(m, r) ⊗ n = 〈gr, hr · gm〉n = 〈(gr)n, (hr)n · (gm)n〉 = 〈gr·n, hr·n · gm·n〉 =
Eh((m · n) mod q, (r · n) mod q)
3.2 MarkPledge3 Insights
Figure 1 depicts the MP3 candidate vote encryption and veriﬁcation. A MP3
candidate vote encryption BitEnc(b) = 〈u, v〉 is composed by two independent
encryptions: u is the encryption of either b′ = 1 for a Y ESvote or b′ = −1 for
a NOvote; v is the encryption of a random commit code (θ), which, in the case
of a Y ESvote, is pledged over an untappable channel to the voter as being the
corresponding veriﬁcation code.
After the encrypted vote creation by the vote machine, the voter selects a
random challenge c that will be used by the vote machine to create a public
veriﬁable receipt (ϑ, ω). ϑ is the public veriﬁcation code and ω the public data
that allows to prove that ϑ is the correct veriﬁcation code for the pair (u, v).
ϑ correctness is guaranteed by an independent third party veriﬁcation of the
following equality: uc−ϑ · v = 〈gω, hω · gc〉 = Epk(c, ω). Thus, assuming that
u encrypts a value b′ ∈ {−1, 1}, which can be proved by known techniques, cf.
section 4, the preceding equality and the homomorphic properties of the ElGamal
cryptosystem guarantee that ϑ ∈ {θ, 2 · c − θ}, cf. equation 1. The encryption
factor ω can be easily computed by the vote machine as ω = τ · (c− ϑ) + δ.
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uc−ϑ · v = Epk(c, ω) ⇒
b′ · (c− ϑ) + θ = c ⇔ ϑ = b
′ · c− c + θ
b′
thus:
b′ = 1 ⇒ ϑ = θ ∧ b′ = −1 ⇒ ϑ = 2 · c− θ
(1)
By equation 1, before knowing the challenge value c, the vote machine can only
pledge the veriﬁcation code ϑ for a Y ESvote (b′ = 1), which is the random
commit code θ encrypted in v. Thus, the voter receipt veriﬁcation for a Y ESvote
is just the veriﬁcation that pledge = ϑ, which is a simple string match.
A NOvote veriﬁcation requires some extra work for the voter. In this case, the
vote machine pledges the value θ and the voter must reconstruct the veriﬁcation
code ϑ = 2 · c − θ. Although, the MarkPledge based vote protocols usually do
not require the voter to perform this veriﬁcation by providing a proof that there
is only one Y ESvote candidate encryption in the vote, cf. sections 1 and 2.1.
The details on how to create such proof for MP3 are presented in section 4.1.
The voter veriﬁcation, as described in this section, requires the match of a
long string by the voter, i.e. both the pledge value and the veriﬁcation code
domains are Zq. This usability issue is addressed in section 4.2.
Finally, note that in the special case where c = θ nothing is proved about the
value of b′. However, assuming that the c value is selected randomly from a large
domain this possibility is negligible.
3.3 MarkPledge3 Soundness and Zero-Knowledge Properties
This section provides proof sketches for the MP3 soundness and zero-knowledge
properties. The proof sketches follow the MP3 candidate encryption and veriﬁ-
cation protocol described in ﬁgure 1.
Theorem 1. Under the semantic security of the ElGamal cryptosystem, MP3
oﬀers a veriﬁcation soundness of 1 − 2/q, provided that the value u is a valid
encryption, i.e. u encrypts either b′ = 1 or b′ = −1.
Proof Sketch. In order to prove the soundness of MP3, we will show that the
probability that the voting machine or any other adversary have to cheat the
voter in believing that she has issued a Y ESvote while she has actually issued
a NOvote is 1− 2/q. The converse probability of cheating the voter in believing
that she had issued a NOvote while she had issued a Y ESvote may be easily
shown to also be 1− 2/q.
Assuming a valid u, the validation of the equality uc−ϑ · v = 〈gω, hω · gc〉
ensures by equation 1 that ϑ = θ if b′ = 1 (Y ESvote), and that ϑ = 2 · c− θ if
b′ = −1 (NOvote). Given that the voter checks that the pledge of her’s vote is
pledge = ϑ, the only way the vote machine or another adversary have to fool the
voter is to pledge to the voter a value pledge = ϑ = 2 · c − θ, without knowing
the challenge c (the challenge is revealed only after the pledge). Since c ∈R Zq
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it is trivial to note that pledge = 2 · c− θ would also have a random distribution
in Zq. Therefore, the vote machine has only a probability of 1/q to guess such
value. Finally, removing the case where nothing is proved about b′, when c = θ,
we can conclude that MP3 oﬀers a vote veriﬁcation soundness of 1− 2/q.
Theorem 2. Under the semantic security of ElGamal cryptosystem, the candi-
date vote encryption veriﬁcation is zero-knowledge to every one not knowing the
pledge, provided that the challenge c is randomly and independently chosen from
the pledge value.
Proof Sketch. Assuming the semantic security of ElGamal cryptosystem nei-
ther u or v reveal anything about the vote encrypted in u. Identically, under
the challenge c independence generation assumption, c reveals nothing about
the value encrypted in u, or v. Given that ω = ((c − ϑ) · τ + δ) is a linear com-
bination of the two ElGamal random factors, used to generate u and v, it can
reveal one of the encryptions u or v but only if the other one is broken. Since no
individual public factor used by the veriﬁcation code correctness proof reveals
the vote, the only other solution is testing all together with the veriﬁcation code
validation equation: uc−ϑ ·v = 〈gω, hω ·gc〉. However, by equation 1, for the same
combination of public values u, v, c, ϑ and ω there is always two possible scenar-
ios for which the equation holds, i.e. the scenario in which u encrypts b′ = −1
(NOvote) and v is the encryption of θ = 2 · c− ϑ is indistinguishable from the
scenario in which u encrypts b′ = 1 (Y ESvote) and v encrypts θ = ϑ.
4 MarkPledge 3 Functions Details
In order to better compare MP3 with MP1 and MP2, this section presents the
MP abstraction layer, along with its MP3 speciﬁcation. The MP abstraction layer
is composed by a set of ﬁve functions that all MP solutions have, although these
functions in the previous MP speciﬁcations were implicit in the vote protocols.
Due to space constrains the functions implementations for MP1 and MP2 are
presented in an extended version of this paper [18].
The ﬁrst two functions execute the candidate vote encryption (VEpk) and
the receipt (veriﬁcation code) creation (RCpk). The ﬁrst one corresponds to the
BitEnc(b) encryption in MP1 and MP2, whilst the second one bares no name in
MP1 and MP2 previous descriptions. The next two functions are the candidate
vote (VVpk) and receipt (RVpk) validation functions. Finally, the last function
(Cpk) prepares the candidate votes for an anonymous vote tally process with
a canonization process. All functions use the election’s public key pk, which is
usually generated by a set of trustees using a threshold scheme.
Additionally, in section 4.1 it is described how to verify that a set of candidate
votes contains only one Y ESvote and how to perform a veriﬁable homomorphic
vote tally with MP3. Finally, section 4.2 shows how to adjust the ϑ veriﬁcation
code to a size that is easily usable by humans.
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Vote Encryption
VEpk(b, θ, r) = 〈BitEnc(b), voteV alidity〉
Where:
BitEnc(b) = 〈u, v〉 = 〈Epk(b′, τ) = gτ , hτ · gb′ , Epk(θ, δ)〉
b′ =
{
1 if b = 1 (Y ESvote)
−1 if b = 0 (NOvote)
r = τ ‖ δ, h = election public key (pk)
voteV alidity = 〈a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, r1, r2, c〉
if b = 1 (Y ESvote)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ, r1, d1 ∈R Zq
a1 = gr1+τ ·d1, a2 = gσ
b1 = hr1+τ ·d1 · g2·b′·d1 , b2 = hσ
d2 = c− d1, r2 = σ − τ · d2
if b = 0 (NOvote)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ, r2, d2 ∈R Zq
a1 = gσ, a2 = gr2+τ ·d2
b1 = hσ, b2 = hr2+τ ·d2 · g2·b′·d2
d1 = c− d2, r1 = σ − τ · d1
c = Hash(u, a1, a2, b1, b2)
The vote encryption function VEpk is used in the ﬁrst phase of a vote protocol
to generate each candidate vote encryption, cf. step 3 of the simpliﬁed MP vote
protocol presented in section 2.1. In MP3 each candidate vote BitEnc(b) is a
simple pair of exponential ElGamal encryptions, dubbed u and v. The ﬁrst one
encrypts a value b′ ∈ {−1, 1} accordingly to the value of b and the second is
just the encryption of θ ∈R Zq. Both encryptions use exponential ElGamal with
the randomization factors τ and δ derived from the input value r = τ ‖ δ. The
voteV alidity data proves that u is an ElGamal exponential encryption of a value
b′ ∈ {−1, 1}. In MP3 it consists in the output of the ballot validity proof protocol
of Cramer et al. [14]. In its original context, the Cramer et al. protocol proves
that a vote is an ElGamal exponential encryption of a message m ∈ {−1, 1},
which is exactly our deﬁnition of a valid u.
Receipt Creation
RCpk(BitEnc(b), r, c) = 〈ϑ, ω〉
Where:
BitEnc(b) = 〈Epk(b′, τ), Epk(θ, δ)〉
r = τ ‖ δ, c ∈R Zq
ϑ =
{
θ if b′ = 1 (Y ESvote)
2 · c− θ mod q if b′ = −1 (NOvote)
ω = τ · (c− ϑ) + δ mod q
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In the simpliﬁed protocol of section 2.1, the RCpk function is used in step 2 of
the protocol’s second phase, after the pledge has been shown to the voter and
after the challenge c disclosure to the vote machine. This function generates a
receipt (veriﬁcation code ϑ) as explained in section 3.2, i.e. it outputs the ran-
dom commit code θ, if the candidate vote is a BitEnc(1) (i.e. a Y ESvote), or
outputs the θ symmetric value, taking c as the symmetry axis, if the candidate
vote is a BitEnc(0) (i.e. a NOvote). The ω data is the combination of the ran-
domization factors used in the u and v encryptions, which is needed to verify
that the veriﬁcation equation results in an encryption of the challenge value c, as
described by the RVpk function below. In order to work in accordance with the
ElGamal homomorphic properties, both the ϑ and ω values are computed mod q.
Vote Validity
VVpk(BitEnc(b), voteV alidity) = validity
Where:
BitEnc(b) = 〈u = 〈x, y〉, v〉, voteV alidity = 〈a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, r1, r2, c〉
validity =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
True if c = Hash(u, a1, a2, b1, b2)
∧ c = d1 + d2
∧ a1 = gr1 · xd1
∧ a2 = gr2 · xd2
∧ b1 = hr1 · (y · g)d1
∧ b2 = hr2 · (y · g−1)d2
False otherwise
h = election public key (pk)
The VVpk function corresponds to the Cramer et al. ballot validity proof [14].
It is used to ensure that the u component of the candidate vote (BitEnc(b)) is
in fact the encryption of b′ = 1 or b′ = −1, i.e. it is a valid candidate vote. The
function outputs true if the candidate vote is valid and false if it is invalid. In
the simpliﬁed MP protocol of section 2.1, this function can be used immediately
after the ﬁrst phase of the protocol, to ensure the correctness of the vote as soon
as possible, or at the end of the voting process in phase 3.
Receipt Validity
RVpk(BitEnc(b), c, ϑ, ω) = validity
Where:
BitEnc(b) = 〈u, v〉
validity =
{
True if φ = Epk(c, ω) = uc−ϑ · v
False otherwise
The receipt validity function corresponds to the zero knowledge veriﬁcation code
ϑ validation, which can be conducted by any trusted third party to prove that
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uc−ϑ · v is the encryption of c, without any special knowledge but the public
values. This is possible by a reconstruction of the c encryption using the ω
encryption factor, revealed by the RCpk function. From equation 1, proving that
uc−ϑ · v = Epk(c, ω) is enough to prove that ϑ = θ if b′ = 1 or that ϑ = 2 · c− θ
if b′ = −1, which is enough to complement the voter’s veriﬁcation, unless c = θ
where in both cases ϑ = θ. However, since c and θ are chosen randomly from Zq,
this case probability is negligible. The RVpk function is used in the 3rd phase of
the simpliﬁed MP vote protocol presented in section 2.1.
An alternative to the encryption reconstruction method, it is possible to prove
that uc−ϑ · v = Epk(c, ω) is an encryption of the value c without revealing ω
using the Chaum and Pedersen protocol for proving the equality of discrete
logarithms [11]. The Chaum and Pedersen protocol can be used to prove the
encryption Epk(c, ω) = 〈x, y〉 proving that logg x = logh y/(gc).
Canonicalization
Cpk(BitEnc(b), c, ϑ) = 〈canonicalV ote〉
Where :
BitEnc(b) = 〈u, v〉 ∧ canonicalV ote = u
The MP3 candidate vote canonicalization is very simple because the u element
of the BitEnc(b) is already an encryption of a ﬁxed value, b′ ∈ {−1, 1}, that
depends on the candidate vote type, i.e. ∀ BitEnc(1) : b′ = 1 and ∀ BitEnc(0) :
b′ = −1. Therefore, in MP3 the u encryption can be used directly as the
canonicalV ote because after an anonymization process, e.g. mix-net anonymiza-
tion, it can be safely decrypted without revealing any link to the voter, i.e. the
only thing we will see are the 1 and −1 values. MP1 and MP2 require a slightly
more complex vote canonicalization.
4.1 Homomorphic Vote Tally
If the vote protocol uses the vote validity proof (i.e. ensures that all votes either
encrypt a 1 or a -1) it is possible to use the eﬃcient homomorphic vote tally
process of the Cramer et al. vote protocol [14], since the MP3 candidate vote
encryption u is equal to its vote encryption construction. Therefore, instead of
decrypting each vote before counting it, which requires a previous anonymization
process for each vote (usually using a mix-net), the MP3 homomorphic counting
process performs the homomorphic addition of every encrypted vote votej =
BitEnc(b)j1 ‖ BitEnc(b)j2 ‖ . . . ‖ BitEnc(b)jk, where BitEnc(b)ji = 〈uji , vji 〉, j =
1..n, n is the number of valid votes and k is the number of candidates in each
vote. Given that the vote validity function VVpk ensures that each uji = Epk(1)
or uji = Epk(−1), then the vote counting for candidate i will be counti = n+di2 ,
where di is the decryption of the homomorphic addition
⊕n
j=1 u
j
i . However, to
ensure democracy, the protocol must also guarantee that each vote is counted for
only one candidate, which means that the system must ensure that there is only
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Table 1. MarkPledge functions computational costs in mod p exponentiations. The
MP2 voteV alidity, VVpk and Cpk values reﬂect our adjustments to the MP2 solution,
cf. [18]. The MP2 matrix exponentiation, in mod q, is denoted as me.
VEpk [BitEnc(b)] + [voteV alidity] RCpk VVpk RVpk Cpk
MP3 [5] + [5] 0 8 5 0
MP1 [4 · α] + [−] 0 - 2 · α ≈ α
2
MP1a [2 + 4 · α] + [5] 0 8 + 2 · α 2 · α 0
MP2 [6 + 1 ·me] + [8 + 1 ·me] 1 ·me 8 8 + 1 ·me 3 + 1 ·me
one uji = Epk(1) in each vote. Once again, given that each uji is the encryption of
the value 1 or -1, it is only necessary to prove that
⊕k
i=1 u
j
i = Epk(2−k), e.g. using
the Chaum and Pedersen protocol for proving the equality of discrete logarithms
[11] or by revealing the sum of the encryption factors of the uji elements, as
suggested for the validation of the c encryption in the RCpk and RVpk functions.
4.2 Adjusting the Voter’s View of MP3 Output to the α Parameter
Usually, the MP security parameter α is set to a value between 20 and 30, which
means that the voter must compare 4 to 5 character strings to verify that pledge
= ϑ. In MP3 the c, ϑ and θ domains, and consequently the pledge domain, are
deﬁned by the cryptosystem parameter q and not by α. Since the size of q is in the
hundreds of bits range we clearly have a usability issue. To solve this usability
issue we propose a change in the voter’s view of the MP3 functions output,
namely the voter’s view of the veriﬁcation code ϑ and pledge value should be
truncated to α bits by applying the mod 2α operation to the referred values.
Assuming an uniform and random distribution of ϑ and θ over Zq, the voter
veriﬁcation has a statistical soundness of 1 − 21−α, just because q ≫ 2α, i.e.
the voter still performs the veriﬁcation of a random value uniformly distributed
over Z2α , cf. [18]. The soundness is 1 − 21−α and not 1 − 2−α due to the case
where c = θ, where nothing is proved about the value b′ encrypted in u.
5 Evaluation
This section discusses the improvements of MP3 over previous MP proposals
in terms of each of the described functions. We ﬁrst give a theoretical com-
parison of the techniques and then present the times for real implementations
on smart cards. Note that by implementing MP in smartcards we may provide
to each voter her own mobile voting machine without forcing her to trust any
hardware/software device.
Table 1 shows the computational cost of the diﬀerent MP functions in terms
of the number of exponentiations per function. The values for MP3 are accord-
ingly to the MP3 functions deﬁnition of section 4, and the MP1, MP1a and MP2
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values are accordingly to the correspondent functions deﬁnition in [18]. All MP
solutions use the exponential ElGamal encryption, which requires 3 exponenti-
ations. Although, when the message to encrypt is a constant the corresponding
message exponentiation was not considered. This is the case for all ElGamal
encryptions in MP1 and MP1a and for the u encryption of MP3.
As detailed in [18], in MP1 each candidate encryption corresponds to α pairs
of ElGamal encryptions, which corresponds to 4 · α exponentiations. The MP1
RVpk function performs α 1-out-of-2 cut-and-choose veriﬁcations, one for each of
the α encryption pairs, which correspond to 2 ·α exponentiations. The MP1 Cpk
function consists in homomorphically inverting the value inside approximately
α/2 ElGamal encryptions.
The MP1a row in table 1 represents the variant of MP1 proposed by Adida
in [1]. MP1a adds an extra ElGamal encryption to each candidate vote, which
allows the use of the voteV alidity proof and veriﬁcation proposed for MP3 in
section 4. The MP1a VVpk function also needs to attest that the extra encryption
“match” each one of the base α MP1 encryption pairs, cf. [1, 18].
The MP2 solution, cf. [4, 18], encrypts each candidate vote as the encryption
of a 2D vector, which corresponds to 2 ElGamal encryptions, one for each of
the vector coordinates. To compute the 2D vector it is necessary to perform a
modular matrix exponentiation in q. The matrix exponentiation costs turned
out to have a huge impact on the MP2 real performance, cf. section 5.1, thus
they where also included in table 1. The MP2 voteV alidity proof uses the same
technique of MP1a and MP3, but needs some homomorphic vector algebra on
the candidate vote encryption. The RCpk, RVpk and Cpk costs also reﬂect the
need of homomorphic vector algebra.
Excluding the matrix exponentiation, both MP2 and MP3 present an α order
improvement over MP1(a) on the VVpk and RVpk functions, and on the can-
didate vote BitEnc(b) creation. In the Cpk function both MP1a and MP3 are
clearly better as they do not require any computation. The RCpk implementa-
tion on all MP versions is very simple and do not require any complex operation,
except in MP2 where it is required a matrix exponentiation. Even excluding the
matrix exponentiation operations, the improvements of MP3 over MP2 in the
VEpk and RVpk functions are noteworthy. In the VEpk MP3 presents an 17%
improvement in number of exponentiations that grows up to 28.5% with the vote
validity, and in the RVpk MP3 presents an improvement of 37.5%.
When compared in terms of disk usage, MP3 and MP2 present approximately
an α factor improvement over the MP1 and MP1a. In MP3 and MP2 a BitEnc(b)
is composed by two ciphertexts, while in MP1 and MP1a a BitEnc(b) is com-
posed respectively by 2 · α and 1 + 2 · α ciphertexts.
5.1 Implementation Results
In order to verify the real performance impact of MP3 we have partially imple-
mented all MP solutions (MP1, MP2 and MP3). The two main reasons that lead
us to the implementation were: i) the diﬃculty to compare the matrix exponenti-
ation (required by MP2) to the large integer modular exponentiations needed for
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the ElGamal encryptions, which are the base of allMP solutions, and ii) the curios-
ity to see if any MP solution can actually be run on limited devices, such as smart
cards or secure elements inside a mobile phone (usually also implemented as smart
cards) which can open the door for new vote protocols based on the MP technique.
We have implemented the matrix exponentiation using the non-recursive ex-
ponentiation by squaring algorithm (“computation by powers of 2”) described
in [27]. We have optimized the matrix multiplication algorithm to take advan-
tage of the special form of the SO(2, q) matrices used by MP2. The SO(2, q)
test matrices, as deﬁned by MP2, have elements in Zq and are exponentiated to
random exponents in Zq±1 (note that in MP2 the α bits vector indexes must be
transformed into the corresponding exponents, which are uniformly distributed
in Zq±1, cf. [4,18]). We have tested the matrix exponentiation both on a PC and
on smart cards (JavaCard and MULTOS). In the PC we have implemented the
algorithm in Java. Our test code is available on request.
Our implementation results show that on a modern computer (Intel i5 2400
3.1GHz CPU) the matrix exponentiation time for |q| = 160 is about the same of
an integer modular 1024 bits exponentiation with a 160 bits exponent. Thus, the
VEpk function in MP3 presents an improvement of about 40% when compared to
MP2. Moreover, the MP3 RVpk and Cpk functions together, which are necessary
to validate the election public data, are about 2.6 times faster than MP2. In
other words, if with MP3 the election data veriﬁcation takes one day it would
take two and a half days with MP2.
Again, in a modern computer, the voter’s perception of the diﬀerent vote en-
cryption times would be close to none, as a large integer modular exponentiation
takes only a few milliseconds. However, our implementation shows that the same
is not true for more limited devices, e.g. smart cards or secure elements inside a
mobile phone (also implemented as smart cards). We have partially implemented
the diﬀerent MP solutions in two diﬀerent smart cards technologies: a JavaCard
v2.2.1 (JCOP 31 v2.2) and a MULTOS v4.2.1 smart card (MC1-36K-61). The
JavaCard technology was selected because it is widely deployed and it is being
integrated as the secure element in many mobile phones; however the JavaCard
API for large integer modular arithmetic is very limited, which has a negative
impact on the MP performance. Thus, we also use a MULTOS card with a full
large integer modular arithmetic native API.
Due to the very restricted large integer modular JavaCard 2.2.1 API (only
modular exponentiation is available through the RSA engine) we had to program
the modular addition, subtraction and multiplication operations. The addition
and subtraction operations were implemented exclusively in “software”. On the
other hand, the pure software approach for the modular multiplication was not
viable. Thus, we use the formula (a + b)2 − (a − b)2 = 4 · a · b, as in [26]. This
allowed us to perform the modular multiplication in an acceptable time, with the
help of the JavaCard cryptographic processor; however it restricts the modulus
size to values equal or above 512 bits. The “new” JavaCard 3 API still does
not provide a large integer modular arithmetic support. On the other hand, the
MULTOS card has all modular operations available in its native API.
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Table 2. VEpk times in a NXP JCOP 31 v2.2 (JavaCard v2.2.1) with parameters
|p| = 1024, |q| = 512 and α = 24
JCOP 31 v2.2 (JavaCard) MarkPledge VEpk times (|p| = 1024, |q| = 512, α = 24 )
MP1a MP2 MP3
BitEnc(b) 44.2 sec (1921%) 45 min (117391%) 2.3 sec (100%)
voteValidity 6.5 sec ( 100%) 45 min ( 41538%) 6.5 sec (100%)
Total 50.7 sec ( 576%) 90 min ( 30681%) 8.8 sec (100%)
Table 3. VEpk times in a MULTOS v4.2.1 MC1-36K-61 smart card with parameters
|p| = 1024, |q| = 512 and |q| = 160, and α = 24
MC1-36K-61 (MULTOS) MarkPledge VEpk times (|p| = 1024, |q| = 512, α = 24 )
MP1a MP2 MP3
BitEnc(b) 29.4 sec (1729%) 1.5 min (5294%) 1.7 sec (100%)
voteValidity 2.6 sec ( 100%) 1.5 min (3462%) 2.6 sec (100%)
Total 32.0 sec ( 744%) 3.0 min (4186%) 4.3 sec (100%)
MC1-36K-61 (MULTOS) MarkPledge VEpk times (|p| = 1024, |q| = 160, α = 24 )
MP1a MP2 MP3
BitEnc(b) 22.8 sec (1900%) 8.2 sec (683%) 1.2 sec (100%)
voteValidity 1.6 sec ( 100%) 8.8 sec (550%) 1.6 sec (100%)
Total 24.4 sec ( 871%) 17.0 sec (607%) 2.8 sec (100%)
Tables 2 and 3 present the performance times of the MarkPledge VEpk func-
tion on a smart card support. We only present times for this primitive as it is
the only intensive cryptographic function that must be performed by the vote
encryption device. The results for MP3 in Table 2 are real whilst for MP1a and
MP2 were lower estimated. Table 3 presents real results for all MP versions.
The JavaCard times, in table 2, for the MP1a and MP2 are estimated
as follows: the MP1a BitEnc(b) generation time is estimated as 80% of
α · 〈MP3 BitEnc(b) time〉. Each of the MP1a α encryption pairs is composed
of 2 ElGamal encryptions, just like the BitEnc(b) of MP3. The 80% adjustment
comes from the fact that it takes one less exponentiation because it encrypts
two constant values, cf. [1, 18, 22] and table 1. The MP1a voteV alidity gen-
eration time is equal to the MP3 voteV alidity generation time, since both use
exactly the same technique. The MP2 BitEnc(b) generation time is estimated as
〈MP3 BitEnc(b) time〉+ 〈matrix exponentiation time〉. The MP2 BitEnc(b)
is also composed of 2 ElGamal encryptions, however the values to encrypt are
the result of a matrix exponentiation and therefore this time must be added to
the encryption time. The MP2 voteV alidity (as we have speciﬁed in [18]) needs
another matrix exponentiation and three integer exponentiations to enable the
use of the vote validity technique proposed for MP3 and MP1a. Therefore, we use
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〈MP3 voteV alidity time〉+ 〈matrix exponentiationtime〉 as a lower estimative
for the MP2 voteV alidity time.
As can be easily seen in tables 2 and 3, the use of any non native cryptographic
function comes at a huge cost. In the best scenario MP2 only presents a 30%
improvement over MP1 and is 6 times worst than MP3.
Note that the results are for one invocation of the VEpk function, i.e. the
results are for each individual candidate vote encryption. Thus, the values pre-
sented must be multiplied by the number of candidates to give the full vote
encryption time. In practice, a full 10 candidate ballot encryption with proofs
takes on the JavaCard 8.45 minutes, 15 hours or 1.47 minutes using respectively
MP1a, MP2 and MP3. The results for the MULTOS card, with the same setup,
are respectively 5.3 minutes, 30 minutes and 43 seconds. With a more standard
parameters setup (|p| = 1024 and |q| = 160), the results for the MULTOS card
are respectively 4 minutes, 2.8 minutes and 28 seconds.
6 Conclusions
This paper presented the MP3 speciﬁcation, which is more eﬃcient and simpler
than all other previous MP solutions. Moreover, our implementation tests show
that, in low computational power devices, e.g. smart cards or secure elements
inside a mobile phone (usually also smart cards), only MP3 presents an accept-
able performance. The MP3 performance improvements are mainly due to its
simple mathematical structure. That simple structure comes with a small price:
the MP3 soundness is 1 − 21−α vs the 1 − 2−α soundness of the previous MP
solutions.
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